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Abstract
This paper creates a theory of endogenous growth with endogenous institutional change to
analyse the impact that trade openness has on economic growth through a change in institutions
in pre-industrial societies. An elite (landowners) controlling the political power expropriates
another social group (capitalists). This reduces investment in physical capital, the source of
endogenous growth. The rival group (capitalists) can take a military action to expel the group
in power. I study optimal expropriation, growth and institutional change under two scenarios,
autarky and free trade. The simulation results suggest that for a vast majority of cases economies
open to trade generally experience higher growth and earlier institutional change. This is the
consequence of the fact that the elite reduces the expropriation rate when the economy opens up
to trade. In addition, economies specialising in manufacturing products tend to grow more and
introduce institutional change earlier. This is consistent with the divergent pattern in growth
and institutions that Western European Economies were experiencing during the modern era
and the industrial revolution.
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1 Introduction
The history of modern economic growth shows that sustained long-run growth is a recent phe-
nomenon. During the largest part of human history annual per capita income growth was nearly
zero. However, income per capita has enormously accelerated in the last two centuries (Galor,
(2005)). This process, known among economists and historians as the "takeo¤", has been far from
homogeneous across countries. A recent literature outlines the importance of the di¤erences in the
timing of the takeo¤ in determining the observed di¤erences in income per capita across countries
nowadays (Galor (2005) and more recently Basso and Cuberes (2013) and Dalgaard and Strulik
(2013)).
While Western European countries and the Western O¤shots turn out to be the pioneers in
the takeo¤ process, there is substantial heterogeneity across countries within this group. During
the last decade the Unied Growth Theory has provided successful explanations for the long-run
evolution of income per capita from the old regime, characterized by Malthusian growth, to the
modern economic growth regime (Galor and Weil (2002), Galor and Moav (2002), Hansen and
Prescott (2002)). However, there have been very few attempts to explain the di¤erences in the
timing of the takeo¤ across these early escapers. At the heart of these theories is technological
progress and the interaction between population growth, human capital and technology. In these
models variations in technological progress across countries are either exogenous or explained by
di¤erences in population levels and educational attainment.
In this paper I build a theory in which di¤erences in technology, explained by di¤erences in
economic and political institutions, account for the takeo¤ process. In my setup, an elite which
holds the political power creates institutions that generate distortions in the allocation of productive
resources across sectors and reduce the returns on investment. Under this setting, I introduce
international trade and I show that trade and more precisely, the factor-content of trade, may be
succesful in explaining both, the divergent patterns in the evolution of income per capita across
countries from the 16th century until the 19th century, and the takeo¤ process. More precisely,
trade a¤ects technological progress on the one hand through its impact on the fundamentals of the
economy, and on the other hand, through its impact in the current economic institutions. Both
e¤ects have consequences for the evolution of the institutional system in the long run.
The model builds on two main frameworks. The rst one is used to model institutions and
institutional change. This paper adopts the social conict view, which was formally developed
by Acemoglu (2006). According to this theory, there is a conict of economic interests among
di¤erent groups in a society which leads to di¤erent preferences for economic institutions. The
group in power determines the established institutional system, and the other social groups can
take military actions to expel that group from power to establish their own preferred institutions.1
To this framework I add a dynamic dimension and I show that the landowners fear to lose the
political power and consequently the scal rents associated with it, will start an unavoidable gradual
process of institutional improvement. I call the latter institutional change.
The second framework is used to model the structure of production, trade and the engine of
growth. This paper builds on a dynamic version of the Ricardo-Viner specic factor model in
which endogenous growth results from a Learning by Doing externality that is associated with
1This framework has been particularly useful in explaining a variety of political experiences such as the emergence
of democratic institutions in The United States and Western Europe in the 19th century or the Latin American
experience at the end of that century (Acemoglu and Robinson (2006)).
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capital accumulation.2 From the political side, my model distinguishes three main social groups
according to factor endowments and the allocation of political power: the landowners, the capitalists
and the workers. The model starts with a situation where an elite of landowners extracts rents
from the capitalists through expropriation of part of the manufacturing output. This expropriation
reduces capital accumulation, which is the source of endogenous growth. These initial conditions
reect the situation of the Western European economies in pre-industrial societies. On the other
hand, capitalists can nance, with a certain amount of their capital stock, a military intervention
that places them in power. The model explores how trade changes the landownersincentives to
expropriate and the capitalistsincentives to acquire the political power and its consequences for
economic growth.
This study nds that for the vast majority of cases: First, trade openness boosts economic
growth. The fact that trade boosts growth even when countries are not specialising in the technology
leading sector is unique as compared to other models of trade and dynamic comparative advantage
(Matsuyama (1992), Redding (1999), Grossman and Helpman (1991), Galor and Mountford (2008)).
In my model, trade boosts growth even when the country is not specialising in the technology leading
sector, because trade reduces the incentives of the elite to expropriate. Second, for those countries
engaged in trade, the latter accelerates institutional change. The second result is a consequence
of the fact that trade accelerates capital accumulation which increases the benets of acquiring
the political power. Third, Not all countries benet equally from trade. Compared to a country
specialising in agricultural products, a moderate specialisation in manufacturing products fosters
growth and accelerates institutional change. Consequently, this model predicts that trade openness
accelerates growth and institutional change for most of the countries engaged in trade but it also
predicts divergence among them. This divergence is associated with trade specialisation patterns.
To investigate the implications of the model on the takeo¤ process, I calibrate the model ac-
cording to the Western Europes experience of Atlantic Trade in the Modern Age (16th century-
18th century). Applied to this particular historical case, the model predicts that Atlantic Traders,
should have experimented higher growth and earlier institutional change than the other european
counterparts. However, I should observe divergence among the Atlantic Traders based on speciali-
sation patterns. Following the historical evidence,3 England and the Netherlands which specialised
in manufactured goods should have experimented higher growth and earlier institutional change
than Spain and Portugal which specialised in agricultural products. I nd empirical support for
this prediction.
This paper is related to several literatures. The rst one is the already mentioned Unied
Growth Theory (UGT). Galor and Mountford (2008) propose a theory in which trade plays a cen-
tral role in the time of the demographic transition, crucial to the take-o¤ in UGT models. I stress
however, the impact that the creation of institutions ensuring property was having on technolog-
ical progress.4 The inclusion of imperfect institutions in my set-up allow us to obtain a positive
2The Ricardo-Viner specic factor model is commonly used in international trade to illustrate the distributional
e¤ects of trade. Notice that distribution is at the heart of the political conict in this model. Learning by Doing
is one of the simplest ways to introduce endogenous growth and it is consistent with the literature on growth in
preindustrial societies (Mokyr, 1990).
3We discuss the historical evidence in the following section.
4We are not the rst to support the idea that the change in institutions ensuring property is at the roots of the
takeo¤ process. The importance of good institutions in the growth acceleration process of the last two centuries have
been pointed out by numerous researchers from the early contributions of North and Thomas (1973) to the more
recent contribution of Jones (2001). In this paper we provide a theory in which trade through endogenous institutions
leads the takeo¤ process.
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Figure 1: GDP p.c. from a sample of selected countries. The values are expressed in 1990 Interna-
tional Geary-Khamis dollars. Data comes from Maddison (2005)
e¤ect of trade openness on growth even when the country specialises in agricultural goods, which
is consistent with the empirical evidence cited above. The second one is the theoretical literature
on growth and institutions (Eicher and García Peñalosa, (2008), Bourguignon and Verdier, (2000),
Galor, Moav and Vollrath (2009), Falkinger and Grossman, (2005)). The rst three papers, are en-
dogenous growth models with endogenous institutions. These papers focus on di¤erent institutions
(intellectual property rights, policies toward promoting public education), and di¤erent historical
episodes. While some of the political economy elements of my model are common to their frame-
works, they do not explore the impact of trade on the creation of growth-promoting institutions.
Falkinger and Grossman (2005) analyze the interaction between all three, by focusing on the elites
incentives to promote public education in a model where human capital accumulation is the source
of growth. Finally, this paper is also connected to the theoretical literature on the impact of trade
on institutions (Levchenko (2009)). Unlike that paper, I establish a connection between trade, in-
stitutions and technology in a dynamic context to allow the analysis of the e¤ects of trade openness
on economic growth.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes in detail the empirical motivation and it
also discusses the empirical and historical literature. Section 3 lays out the main elements of the
model: technology, preferences and decisions. Section 4 discusses the results of the autarkic model.
Section 5 presents the small open economy version of the model and describes the main implications
of trade openness on growth and institutional change. In Section 6 I discuss the evidence in support
of my model. Section 7 concludes.
2 Empirical Motivation and Literature Review.
Figure 1 shows the evolution of income per capita across Western European economies from 1000-
1900 (Maddison, (2001)). Countries like England and the Netherlands show an earlier takeo¤ at
the beginning of the 19th century while Spain and Portugal experienced the takeo¤ later (around
the mid of the 19th century).
This gure reveals that before these countries were taking o¤, there were already di¤erences
in per capita income growth rates among them.5 More precisely, these di¤erences appear in the
5The use of GDP p.c. gures before 1820 has been always controversial for growth economists due to the lack
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early 16th century. In fact, this is the beginning of a period that economic historians dened as the
rst era of world globalization. The discovery of America and new Asian trade routes increased
dramatically the volumes of world trade at an annual rate of 1%, which was around three times
the average annual growth rate for Europe (ORourke and Williamsom (2002).
The idea that Spain and Portugals positions in the Global Trade did not contribute to their
economic success is not new in economic history. Acemoglu et al. (2005b) provide empirical support
to the fact that these new trade routes, and more precisely trade with the Americas (Atlantic Trade),
was accelerating growth through its impacts on institutions. According to the authors, Atlantic
Trade created in England and the Netherlands a growing rich class of merchants and manufacturers
that invested substantially in the control of the political power and consequently the institutional
setting in the following decades. The resulting change in institutions promoted growth through a
more secure system of property rights.
However, Atlantic Trade did not bring the same benets to all countries involved like Spain
or Portugal. Acemoglu et al. (2005b)s main hypothesis is that those countries were organizing
trade through crown monopolies that were used as a scal instrument. This paper contributes
to this literature by theoretically exploring a new link between trade openness and the economic
(un)success of Western European countries: the impact of trade on institutions. The theory reveals
that trade may have contributed to the growth and institutional divergence experiences observed
across Western European countries, through a di¤erent link: Specialisation patterns. More precisely,
the current paper emphasizes that the specialisation pattern of England and The Netherlands in the
New World Market fostered growth and institutional change in these countries, while the Spanish
and Portuguese one delayed the emergence of growth promoting institutions.
Spain, as most of the Atlantic Traders, was organising overseas trade through state monopolies.
In 1503 the Spanish Crown created the Casa de Contratacion a royal institution in charge of
inspecting and regulating trade with Spains overseas possessions. This institution granted the
monopoly of trade operations to the Consulado of Seville, a corporation of merchants from the city
of Seville and they only allowed Spanish products to be traded in the Americas. This monopoly
was bringing a unique opportunity for Spanish manufacturers to have access to a vast market in
which they can sell their products and obtain large prots.
However, in reality very few manufacturing products traded in the Americas had Spanish origins
from the very beginning and frequently, European and specially English and Dutch merchants sent
their own products through legal procedures (selling their products directly to the members of
the Consulado) or more circumvent procedures (bribing o¢ cials, buying intermediaries names
etc...) to the Americas. As Hamilton (1934), Chaunu (1955), Kamen (1984), and more recently,
Marquez (2006) and Finlay and ORourke (2007) point out Spanish trade with the Americas was
mostly in agricultural products (wine, sherry, olives, oil) and by the late 16th century non-Spanish
manufacturing products dominated shipments to the New World. This suggests that the Spanish
manufacturing products were not competitive enough to be exported to the Americas, and Spanish
of accurate data. An alternative way of measuring standards of living before 1820 is the use of urbanization rates.
In Appendix 1 I show urbanization rates for the same sample. I show that the evolution of both measures is very
similar. For the case of England the urbanization rates and the GDP p.c.are not strictly comparable since the
urbanization rates includes the territory of England and Wales (Britain), while the GDP p.c. growth rate is for the
United Kingdom. Both trends however show a dramatic change in the 16th century and since Scotland was not a
very populated country at that time these trends can not change dramatically with the inclusion of Scotland in the
former one.
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merchants preferred to buy the more competitive Dutch and British manufacturing products to
resell them to the colonies rather than buying domestic products. My model suggests that this
was precisely the reason why Spain did not benet as much from the trade with the Americas in
the 16th century and that this may be the reason for the late Spanish industrialization due to its
negative impact on the evolution of institutions.
In a recent paper, Acemoglu et al. (2011) stress the idea that the Napoleonic invasion may have
contributed signicantly to the institutional change that certain economies of Western Europe (i.e.
Spain, Portugal, German Republics before the unication) were experiencing by the rst half of the
nineteenth century.6 This paper consequently suggests that the institutional change in Spain and
Portugal in the 19th century could have been the result of an historical accident. The current paper
is also consistent with this evidence since it claims that trade and more precisely, the factor-content
of trade, favors institutional change in The Netherlands and Britain, while it delayed it in Spain
and Portugal. By the early 19th century, England and the Netherlands have already undertaken
institutional improvement while that was not the case for Spain and Portugal (Acemoglu 2005b)
until the arrival of Napoleon.
3 The model
3.1 The structure of the game
Consider an economy that is inhabited by a continuum of individuals. These individuals live for
one period that in this model is interpreted as a generation. Each of these individuals has one
child that forms the next generation in the next period. Capital accumulation is guaranteed by
bequests to the future o¤spring.7 The inhabitants have homogeneous preferences but di¤er in their
sources of income, access to asset markets and the initial endowment of political power. According
to these characteristics I can identify three kind of agents: landowners, workers and capitalists. For
simplicity I assume that the three groups are equal in size, constant along time and normalized to
one.
At time t = 0, there is an equal distribution of land among the landowners who monopolise
the political power. At the beginning of each period, the landowners inherit a certain amount
of land from their ancestors and the political power. Landowners use their power to expropriate
a proportion  t of the total production of the manufacturing sector which is equally distributed
among them.8
At the beginning of the period, capitalists inherit an amount of capital from their predecessors.
Capitalists can react to expropriation by investing part of the capital stock in a military action to
acquire political power. If they do not carry undertake a military action, the landowners remain in
power.
6These authors explore the role played by the Napoleonic invasion on several indicators related to the institutional
quality and income per capita in a panel of German regions. In their conclusions the authors suggest that a similar
story could be behind the institutional experiences of Spain and Portugal during the same period.
7This paper considers "Joy of giving " preferences: Individuals derive direct utility from leaving bequests by itself.
This is substantially di¤erent from the standard Barro type preferences in which individuals leave bequests because
they care about the utility of their descendants. Altonji et al., (1997) provide empirical evidence supporting this type
of preferences.
8Following the voluminous recent literature on property rights we represent an imperfect system of property rights
as a proportional tax on output. (Acemoglu (2006), Gonzalez (2005)).
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In each period the order of the events in the decision tree is as follows:
1. Landowners decide the expropriation rate.
2. Capitalists decide whether to undertake military action to acquire the political power.
3. Consumption and production decisions are carried out.
The expropriation rate is chosen before the production and consumption decisions are made to
avoid holdup problems, which are not the focus of the paper. An alternative decision tree in which
the capitalists take their political decision before landowners decide the amount of expropriation
does not alter qualitatively the main results of this paper.9
3.2 Production
In the economy there are two nal goods: agricultural and manufactured. Each sector uses a
specic factor of production (land and capital respectively) and competes for labour which is
perfectly mobile across sectors. The following functional forms characterize the technologies that
are used in each sector:
Y At = (XtTt)
  XtLAt 1  ; (1)
YMt = K

t
 
XtL
M
t
1 
; (2)
where I denote Y At as the production in the agricultural sector. The production of agricultural goods
depends on the stock of land available in the country Tt, the knowledge externality, Xt, and LAt
which represents the labour used in agriculture. I denote YMt the production in the manufacturing
sector that depends on the stock of capital Kt ; the knowledge externality Xt; and the labour in
the manufacturing sector, LMt .
In this economy technological advances are the result of a knowledge externality associated with
capital accumulation:
Xt = Kt; (3)
This assumption is based on the early works by economic historians (Mokyr (1990)).10 I consider
that this knowledge externality not only makes workers more e¢ cient in production as in the
classical specication of Romer (1986) but it also increases the e¢ ciency in the usage of the land
in the agricultural sector.11 This is consistent with the very well-known stylized fact that at the
early stages of development technological progress was having a strong impact in productivity on
the agricultural sector (Mokyr (1990)).12
9Available on request.
10The classic work of Mokyr, "The lever of riches" provides a good survey on the history of technological progress
during that time. The chapter provides many examples of technological improvements that were the result of expe-
rience, or a learning process. For example, when talking about the instrumenting industry, the author claims that
"Most improvements were the result of serendipity and trial and error searches. Learning and training took place
mostly through apprenticing and informal contact" (p.72)
11One of the most important changes at the industry level during the late medieval time but mostly in the modern
era was the migration of certain parts of the industry from the cities to rural areas, a phenomenon that was baptised
by economists and historians as proto-industrialization (Kamen (1984)). Certainly, this process was promoted by
urban enterpreneurs. The increase in the number of contacts between urban enterpreneurs and rural workers may
have helped the di¤usion of technological knowledge in rural areas. (Mokyr, 1990).
12The qualitative predictions of the model do not change under an alternative scenario in which the productivity
in the agricultural sector is growing at a lower path than the one in the manufacturing sector.
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In this society, the access to specic production factors is contingent on an individualsmem-
bership in a particular social group. Access to capital goods is restricted to the capitalists, access
to the land is restricted to the landowners and workers are the only ones supplying labour in this
economy. This is consistent with the empirical evidence on the minor role played by landowners
during the early stages of the industrial revolution.13
At the beginning of each generation, the capitalists inherit the capital their parents left to
them. After the landowners decide on the level of expropriation, they decide whether to undertake
military action to acquire the political power by investing a part of their stock of capital. The
remaining capital is the full capital stock when no conict has taken place. Each of the capitalists
use their remaining capital stock and hire labour to produce competitively manufactured goods.
Since all capitalists are identical I solve for the general problem. More precisely, the capitalists, as
producers, solve the following problem:
max
LMt
(1   t)ptYMt   wtLMt :
for a given expropriation rate  t: I use the agricultural good as the numeraire so, pt is the price
of the manufacturing good in terms of the agricultural good. I denote with rt the implicit returns
per unit of capital dedicated to the production of manufactured goods. Consequently the returns
to capitalists as a group are given by:
rtKt = (1   t)ptYMt   wtLMt : (4)
Each of the landowners use their own stock of land and hire workers to produce competitively
the agricultural good. More precisely, the landowners, as producers, solve the following problem:
max
LAt
Y At   wtLAt ;
I denote with dt the implicit rents obtained from using one unit of land in agricultural produc-
tion. Consequently, the returns to landowners as a group are given by:14
dtTt = Y
A
t   wtLAt : (5)
13Crouzet (1985) nds that for the case of the British Industrial revolution, during the period (1750-1850) only 3%
of the enterpreneurs were part of the upper class and less than 10% were descendants of landowning elites. Doepke
and Zilibotti (2005) discuss the small role played by the landowners elite and aristocracy in the early stages of the
Industrial Revolution.
14Notice that since all agents are identical I have just dened the capitalists and landownersproduction problem
in terms of the representative agent within their social group for expositional clarity. The results are identical to an
alternative structure in which I assume that each agent cannot cultivate its own land or use its own stock of capital
and she needs to rent it to another landowner or another capitalist.
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3.3 Consumption
In this section I describe how each type of agent decides on their consumption and bequest. I
denote with subscript i = T;K;L the variables associated with landowners, capitalists and workers,
respectively.
Since landowners are identical in preferences and endowments and land is a xed factor, in
equilibrium, each landowner will bequeath her entire endowment of land. I can abstract from that
problem and focus only on the landownersconsumption decision which is given by the solution to
the following maximization problem
max
cATt;c
M
Tt
ln
 
cATt
  
cMTt
1 
(6)
s:t: cATt + ptc
M
Tt  dtTt +  tYMt
for a given tax, where, cATt; c
M
Tt; are respectively the agricultural and the manufacturing con-
sumption bundles of the landowners;  is the proportion of expenditure spent on agricultural goods.
The capitalists decide how to split their resources between consumption and bequests (BKt) to
the next generation. These bequests are used to cover the depreciation of existing capital, and to
build new capital that passes to the future generation. Capitalists solve:
max
cAKt;c
M
Kt;BKt
ln
 
cAKt
  
cMKt
1 
+  lnBKt
s:t: cAKt + pt
 
cMKt +BKt
  rtKt
BKt =Kt+1   (1  )Kt (7)
K0> 0; given:
Workers do not have access to either capital or land and therefore, they cannot leave bequests
to the future generations. Each worker is endowed with one unit of labour. They solve:
max
cALt;c
M
Lt
ln
 
cALt
  
cMLt
1 
s:t: cALt + ptc
M
Lt  wt
4 The Equilibrium in Autarky
4.1 Consumption and production decisions
The preference structure allow us to concentrate on sub-game perfect equilibrium within each
period. Therefore, I solve the model by backward induction. In this section I analyse the optimal
consumption bundle, the optimal bequest and the optimal allocation of workers across sectors,
given  t and the political decision. Cobb-Douglas preferences imply that the consumption of each
good for each group is given by the following demand functions:
cAit = Eit; i = T;K;L (8)
9
cMit = (1  )
Eit
pt
; i = T;K;L (9)
where Eit; is expenditure dedicated to consumption. For workers and landowners I have that
consumption expenditure is equal to income:
ETt = dtTt +  tptY
M
t (10)
ELt =wtLt:
However, for capitalists, I have that:
EKt =
1
1 + 
rtKt (11)
BKt =

1 + 
rtKt
pt
(12)
since they also leave bequests to their descendants. Using equation 7, yields
Kt+1
Kt
=

1 + 
rt
pt
+ (1  ) (13)
Let Cjt =
X
i=T;K;L
cjit; j = A;M I have that:
CAt
CMt
=

1   pt: (14)
Labour is perfectly mobile across sectors. Solving the production problem for each type of agent,
I obtain:
wt =
(1  )Y At
LAt
=
(1  )(1   t)ptYMt
LMt
(15)
substituting the previous equation in the denitions for dt and rt yields,
rt =
(1   t)ptYMt
Kt
(16)
dt =
Y At
Tt
(17)
To close the model I impose market clearing conditions for labour and nal consumption goods:
LAt + L
M
t = 1 (18)
CAt = Y
A
t (19)
CMt +BKt = Y
M
t (20)
where,
BKt =
 (1   t)YMt
1 + 
: (21)
and condition (3) which must hold in equilibrium.
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Using (14), (19), (20) and 21 I obtain:
pt =

1  


1 + 
1 + (1  (1   t))

| {z }
demand channel

Y At
YMt

| {z }
supply channel
: (22)
The expropriation rate a¤ects the price of the manufactured goods through two channels: the
demand channel and the supply channel. The rst one is the e¤ect of expropriation on the demand
of manufactured products: an increase in expropriation reduces the demand of capitalistsbequests.
The latter decreases the relative demand of manufactured products reducing pt. The second one
is the e¤ect of expropriation on the optimal allocation of workers across sectors, which a¤ects
the relative supply of each good. Expropriation reduces the marginal productivity of labour in
the manufacturing sector, which shifts workers to the agricultural sector. The latter increases
the relative supply of agricultural goods and decreases the relative supply of manufactured goods.
Consequently pt increases. Taking (15) and (22) and combining them:
LMt
LAt
=

1  


(1 + )(1   t)
(1 + (1  (1   t))

(23)
Substituting (23) in (22), I have:
pt =

1  

 (Tt)
(1   t)1 

1 + 
(1 + (1  (1   t))

(24)
where the rst term accounts for the supply e¤ect discussed above. It can be shown that the relative
price, is monotonically increasing in taxes for reasonable values of .15
Proposition 1 dptd t > 0; if  < 
 = 1+1+(2  t) :
Proof. See appendix.
The latter becomes an important result since as it will become apparent, trade will have an
impact on expropriation through this channel.
Substituting (2) and (16) in (21), I obtain the law of motion of capital which is given by:
Kt+1
Kt
=
 (1   t)
 
LMt
1 
1 + 
+ (1  ) (25)
Total output is given by:
Yt =

Tt
 
LAt
1 
+ pt
 
LMt
1 
Kt: (26)
Looking at condition (25) it can be seen that the level of  t is crucial in the dynamics of the model.
Equation (26) shows that expropriation creates a distortion in production. In a further section I
will see that the expropriation rate that maximizes aggregate output growth is  t = 0:
15Notice that the supply channel comes through the e¤ect that expropriation has on the allocation of labour across
sectors. The more important labour is as a production factor in the economy (the lower is ); the larger will be
the e¤ect of these reallocations on the equilibrium price (the stronger will be the supply channel). Since 0 <  < 1;
0 <  < 1; then the possible values for  are 1
2
<  < 1: For  > 1
2
which is going to be the case later, the set of
possible values of  for the calibrated model is 0:85 <  < 1:For  = 0;  = 0:75: Data do not report such a high
values for 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4.2 Political decisions
4.2.1 Capitalistspolitical decision.
Capitalists have access to a technology that allows them to take power by investing m units of their
capital stock. This cost m takes the following expression:
m = ' (Kt)
" ; 0  " < 1; ' > 0 (27)
The functionm can be intepreted as the cost of nancing an army, that with probability one removes
the landowners from power. I allow m to change with the countrys stock of capital, a proxy to the
countrys level of income. This reects the possibility that a change in the political regime could be
more costly in more economically advanced economies.16 The parameter " measures the elasticity
of the conict cost with respect to a countrys level of development. The larger "; the more sensitive
this cost is to changes in the level of development. The parameter ' captures di¤erences in initial
political conditions. In economies with a strong state infrastructure (i.e. with a large military
force) capitalists require more resources for a change in the political regime, so the cost is higher.
When deciding whether to undertake military action, capitalists take two factors into account:
Firstly, the change must be protable and second it must be nanced. In order to keep the model
simple, I assume that capitalists cannot expropriate the landowners after they acquire the political
power.17 The capitalists undertake military action if:
VKt( t = 0; Kt = K

t   '(Kt )")  VKt( t = t ;Kt = Kt ) > 0 (28)
Kt  m(Kt ) (29)
where I denote the variables with ""; the variables at the time of the military action with the
landowners in power. Substituting the optimality conditions and rearranging terms I obtain the
capitalistsindirect utility function:18
VKt = ln
0@RKt (K) 11+
p
1  
1+
t
1A1+
where RKt = rtKt is the income of the capitalists and K is a constant.
19 Substituting the latter
in the utility function and using (28), I obtain that the capitalists undertake military action when
the following condition holds:
Ln
 
rt(Kt  m(Kt))  (1  )ptm(Kt)
rtKt
 
(pt )
1+ 
1+
(pt)
1+ 
1+
!!
> 0 (30)
provided that Kt  m(Kt ): On the left hand side of equation (30) I can clearly distinguish two
elements: The rst one compares the relative income of the capitalists in both regimes. In the
16Although in this model, for simplicity, I have not included the possibility that landowners repress the capitalists
military action, repression from the elite could be easier in more advanced economies. This could be modelled as an
increasing cost of undertaking a military action. Allowing for this possibility helps us to get a richer set of results.
Notice that when " = 0; we will be in the case in which the cost of a military coup is independent of the level of
development. I thank an anonymous referee for this suggestion.
17A case in which I allow for this possibility will not alter considerably the results. (Available on request).
18The derivation of the indirect utility functions for the di¤erent social groups is provided in the appendix.
19K = 
(1 )1 
(1+)1+
:
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numerator the capitalists have undertaken the military action so they enjoy full returns per unit of
capital (rt): However, the revolution has been costly (m(Kt)); so they lose the returns on these units
(rtm(Kt) and the residual value of these units, (1  )ptm(Kt): In the denominator, the capitalists
have not undertaken military action and consequently their income is given by their returns on
capital considering the expropriation. The second element takes into account the e¤ects on the
utility of the change in the price of the manufactured goods under both regimes. Substituting (16)
and (24) in (30) and rearranging terms I obtain the following result:
Proposition 2 When " < 1; there exists a threshold level of capital K such that:
If Kt  K the capitalists want to undertake military action.
If Kt < K the capitalists decide not to undertake military action.
The threshold level of capital is given by:
Kt  K = (')
1
1 " :
where:
 =
0BB@ 1
1 

(1   t)

LMt
LMt
1 


(LMt )
1 
1 +(LMt )
1 

1CCA
 =
 
1
1   t
1  (1 + (1  ))
1 + (1  (1   t))
! 1+
Proof. See appendix.
The benets of a military action are proportional to the capital stock, however the costs also
increase with the capital stock. As long as " < 1; the costs of undertaking military action increase
more slowly than the benets as the capital stock increases. This implies that there is a threshold
level of capital stock above which undertaking military action is always protable. In an autarky,
the larger the interest rate, the larger the threshold level of capital stock that is needed for a military
action to occur. It should be noted that if (28) holds, (29) holds (since  > 1): This implies that
whenever the military action is protable capitalists could nance it.20
Proposition 2 implies that, provided that the economy is on a positive Balanced Growth Path
(BGP), there would be a nite point in time in which the threat of a coup becomes binding for
the landowners. The next proposition shows that if the expropriation rate decreases the capitalists
prefer to delay the political change. This comes from the fact that the decrease in expropriation,
decreases the benets of acquiring the political power and consequently mitigates the incentives of
the capitalists to undertake the military action.
Proposition 3 The capitalists reaction function is declining in the amount of expropriation (i.e.
When  t increases K decreases).
Proof. See appendix.
20The special case of " = 1 is discussed in the appendix.
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4.2.2 The expropriation decision
To obtain the landowners indirect utility I substitute (8) and (9) in (6) and I rearrange terms.
This yields:
VTt = ln

RTtT
(pt)
1 

(31)
where RTt is the landowners income and T is a constant from the point of view of expropria-
tion.21The landowners decide on the level of expropriation by maximizing
max
 t
VTt
I consider rst, the choice of the amount of expropriation when the constraint is not binding
(Kt < K): Substituting the value of RTt; in (31) I nd that:
VTt = ln
 
Y At +  tptY
M
t
  (1  ) ln pt + ln T (32)
The expression shows that initially an increase in the level of expropriation produces an am-
biguous e¤ect on the utility level.
First of all, an increase in expropriation produces a direct e¤ect on utility. Keeping constant
the relative price pt; a rise in expropriation generates an ambiguous e¤ect on scal income: Keeping
constant YMt ; a rise in expropriation increases scal income. However, the rise in expropriation
reduces the marginal productivity of labour in the manufacturing sector. This reduces the output
in the manufacturing sector, since workers move from the manufacturing sector to agriculture. The
latter clearly reduces scal income.
Second, and novel to this paper, an increase in expropriation has an indirect e¤ect on utility
through the relative price pt.22 An increase in expropriation, increases the price of the manufactured
goods. The latter, has a positive e¤ect on the utility due to the rise in the value of scal income,
and a negative one since manufactured goods are more expensive. The increase in pt has also an
indirect e¤ect on the reallocation of labour across activities (the increase in pt, decreases the value
of the marginal productivity of labour in the agricultural sector and it raises it in the manufacturing
sector). A quick look at equation (32) reveals that the net direct e¤ect and the net indirect e¤ect
of taxes on landowners indirect utility are initially ambiguous. However, the production in the
agricultural sector will unambiguously increase with the level of expropriation while the volume of
production in the manufacturing sector will unambiguously decrease with the level of expropriation.
This second indirect e¤ect is crucial in this paper because international trade induces landowners
to change the optimal expropriation rate, which has consequences for growth, mainly through
the price channel. When a small open economy opens up to international trade, the rest of the
world determines the price pt and landowners cannot a¤ect the price level with their expropriation
decisions.
21T = 
(1  )1  :
22Since the e¤ects already discussed are complex, it is generally assumed in the literature that both nal goods are
perfect substitutes so changes in expropriation will not lead to changes in the relative price in equilibrium. Due to
the fact that my focus in this paper is trade openness, the perfect substitution assumption is no longer appropiate.
In addition, as we will see later, the price channel will play a crucial role on the e¤ects of openness on growth.
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Figure 2: The evolution of income in Autarky
When the constraint is binding (Kt > K); landowners simply choose the highest expropriation
level  t =  t; that allows them to avoid the military coup (VKt( t = 0; RKt = rt(Kt   mt)  
pt (1  )mt)   VKt( t =  t; RKt = rtKt) = 0). I know that  t < t when t is the optimal
expropriation rate when the constraint is not binding. I know the latter because of the monotonicity
of the capitalists reaction function. Notice, however, that the next generation faces a similar
problem, since capital grows during the previous generation and so does the benets of acquiring the
political power. The next generation reduces the level of expropriation again to deter the military
intervention. This process is repeated until the economy eventually gets rid of expropriation.
Therefore the model predicts that the expropriation slowly dissappears. This is due to the fact
that once the threat of conict becomes credible, the ruling elite has the incentive to reduce the
expropriation rate to discourage military conict and keep the political power. However, a partial
reduction in expropriation will not remove entirely the political tension. The incentive that each
generation of landowners has to reduce expropriation in order to keep the political power leads
the economy to a situation in which landowners remain in power but expropriation is gradually
removed from the manufacturing sector.23
4.3 Dynamic Evolution of the Economy
The assumption of a Cobb-Douglas functional form for preferences and technologies allows us to
dene a BGP when all variables grow at a constant rate, provided that the capitalistsconstraint
is not binding (K < K). For the growth rate to be positive I need to assume that the economy
starts with a su¢ ciently high level of technology.24
23Notice that when the constraint is binding there is no other solution to discourage conict. The warm-glow
preferences assumed in the paper rule out a situation when the landowners may increase the expropriation rate
before it is binding to avoid a future threat of revolt. We leave this possibility for further research.
24More precisely, the following needs to be assumed:  > 
(1 )(LMt )1 
1+

: An analogous condition is assumed
in standard AK models to derive positive growth. Since the focus of the paper is to study the impact of trade on
the quality of institutions and the growth rate we are not interested in negative growth equilibria. A detailed proof
is provided in the appendix.
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Figure 2 illustrates the dynamics of the model. I denote with t; the time at which the threat
of the military action becomes binding and with Ln Y , the logarithm of income associated with
the stock of capital K. Before t, the economy is on a low growth path since the landowners
expropriate the capitalists and this reduces capital accumulation and growth. When the constraint
becomes binding (t), the capitaliststhreat of conict becomes credible, and the landowners reduce
the amount of expropriation to discourage conict. The reduction in expropriation boosts capital
accumulation and growth. The increase in the growth rate will be smooth as the ruling class will
eliminate the expropriation gradually until the latter is no longer in place. I refer to this process
of gradual improvement of property rights as institutional change.
The main focus of this paper is the impact of trade openness on the timing of the institutional
change. Since, before the constraint is binding, the economy exhibits a unique BGP with no
transitional dynamics, I can compute the number of years necessary to reach the threshold level of
capital K. Consider an arbitrary period t: The number of years from period t necessary to start
the process of institutional change is given by:
n =
2664 1ln(1 + g)| {z }
Growth
0BB@ ln(')1  "| {z }
Incentives
  lnKt
1CCA
3775 (33)
where g is the growth rate of the economy and Kt is the value for period t capital stock.25
In the next section I distinguish between two di¤erent channels through which trade a¤ects
institutional change. The rst one, denoted as the growth mechanism, is the e¤ect that trade has
on the income growth rate and therefore on the speed of capital accumulation. The higher the
growth rate, the faster the economy accumulates capital, and the earlier it reaches the threshold
level of capital K. The second one, denoted as the incentives mechanism, captures how trade
a¤ects the threshold level of capital necessary to undertake political change.
The appendix shows that the optimal tax chosen by landowners is always interior and unique
for all numerical exercises carried out. It was not possible to nd an analytical expression for the
value of  t: Hence, I solved it using numerical methods. To choose the parameter values ; ; ; 
and ; I have calibrated the model to be consistent with historical data on the Western European
experience during the Modern Age.
I obtain the parameter ; which measures the proportion of consumption expenditure on agri-
cultural products, from Ho¤man et al. (2002)s 26 database on European consumption baskets,
and it takes the value of 0:5. To calibrate the depreciation rate, , I take a weighted average of
the annual depreciation rates of the di¤erent types of capital in the Spanish economy in the 19th
century and then compute the residual value of one unit of capital after a generation.27 Then one
minus the residual value will constitute the depreciation rate of the whole generation. I nd an
annual depreciation rate of  = 0:02:28 To calibrate the parameter  I use data on capital shares
25See appendix for a formal proof.
26This database collects data on individual consumption patterns belonging to di¤erent social classes in several
countries across di¤erent periods of time. The data reports di¤erences by social groups and by countries showing that
these di¤erences are large across social groups but not across countries: Expenditure on food and drink represents
49% of the total national consumption expenditure in the UK in the 17th century. This quantity is similar for France
in the 18th century. (Data is from (Ho¤man, Jacks, Levin and Lindert (2002)).
27 I use estimates of stock of capital and depreciation rates for Spain in the 19th century from De la Escosura and
Rosés (2007).
28The same value is also used in Voigtlander and Voth (2006).
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regime  t LMt L
A
t g
expropriation 0.81 0.17 0.83 0.13
No expropriation 0 0.56 0.44 1.60
Table 1: The economy in Autarky
and saving rates obtained for Britain in the 19th century.29 The evidence suggests that by that
time England had already undergone institutional change, so I calibrate these parameters using a
version of the model with no expropriation. This gives a value for  = 12 and a value for  = 0:62:
30
To nd the technological constant ; I use Maddison (2005)s estimate for the average per capita
GDP growth rate in Western Europe in the 15th century which was 0.13% per year. Given that
each period in the model represents a generation, it is necessary to determine the duration of each
generations life. Life expectancy is a poor measure for my purposes here because child mortality
was very high at that time. However, my model does not include this feature, as all my individuals
are assumed to be adult.31 I use the estimates provided by Nicolini (2004) for the life expectancy of
the English population over 25 in the 16th century, which leads to an average adult life expectancy
of 55 years.32
Table (1) reports the optimal expropriation rate, the sectoral composition of the labour force
and the growth rate of output in autarky. The rst row provides data for an initial situation in
which the elite is expropriating (K < K): It should be noted that the landowners in autarky
expropriate a substantial amount of manufacturing output (81%). This is a consequence of the fact
that the increase in expropriation has a positive e¤ect on the value of manufacturing production
and scal income. Therefore, for the landowners, it is optimal to expropriate even when the volume
of manufacturing production falls because the rise in the price more than compensates the decline
in production. In autarky with expropriation, the percentages of the labour force used in each
activity are 17% in manufacturing and 83% in agriculture. I use the proportion of the population
living in medium sized cities, as a proxy for the share of the labour force in the manufacturing
sector to verify that the model matches the data. Recent revised estimates for urbanisation rates
across Europe for the beginning of the 16th century suggest that the average urbanisation rate
(percentage of population living in cities with more than 10,000 inhabitants) was 5.3 %. This
percentage is denitely lower than the one proposed by the model. However, there is heterogeneity
across european regions at that time and countries like The Netherlands (18.9%), Belgium (21.7%)
or Northern and Central Italy (16.4%) are closer to the one predicted by the model.
29This has been the earliest source I have found to calibrate this parameter.
30These parameters are based on Feinsteins estimation of the saving rate (the most commonly used) and Crafts
(1985) estimation of the capital share. Crafts gives a value for rK
Y
= 0:35: This value is also consistent with the
one used in Stokey (2001) and Voigtlander and Voth (2006). Feinstein gives a value for the saving rate of 12% in
1780. Crafts reviewed the estimates for the saving rate giving a value of 8%. Under this second value  = 0:2963;
 = 0:57: The quantitative predictions of the model do not change substantially across these alternative parameter
values (available on request).
31 In a similar exercise, Hansen and Prescott (2002) choose an average duration of 35 years for each period of an
overlapping generation model in which a generation lasts two periods. This would lead to a life expectancy of 70
years. Instead we use a more precise estimation for the period studied taken from Nicolini (2004). Using the Hansen
and Prescott time duration for a generation, our model reports even more plausible results.
32Sensitivity analysis for alternative possible values of ;  and  is available on request. The results do not change
signicantly.
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The second row in Table (1) provides data for a situation in which expropriation is no longer
in place. The table reveals that expropriation is costly for society. Without expropriation, GDPs
growth rate will be 1.6%, that is slightly more than 12 times the growth rate that the economies
experience when landowners are ruling the political power.
In the next section the open economy case is studied. Particularly, I focus on answering two
questions: 1. Does trade foster growth? 2. Does trade accelerate the transition from a low-growth
steady state to a high-growth steady state?
5 Small open economy
I consider the case of a small open economy that opens to trade.33 I assume that when the economy
opens to trade the constraint is not binding (K < K): I also assume that the constraint is not
binding for the generation that opens to trade.34 I denote with pft the equilibrium price for the
manufactured goods of the rest of the world which, given the small open economy assumption is
exogenously given. Consumer decisions are not altered by trade openness. The economy allocates
labour according to the following condition:
LAt
LMt
=
 
(Tt)

(1   t)pft
! 1

(34)
The latter equation shows that when the relative price pft rises, the economy switches resources
from agriculture into manufacturing. As in autarky, the landowners indirect utility function is
given by:
VTt = 
0 + Ln



pft
 1  
LAt
1 
KtT

t +  t

pft

Kt
 
LMt
1 
(35)
Taking the rst order condition for the optimal expropriation rate and combining with the labour
market clearing condition, I can characterize the dynamics of the economy with the following two
equations:
Tt [(1 + (1  )) t +  (  2)] = (1   t)
1+


pft
 1

(36)
Kt+1
Kt
=
 
(1   t) 1
1 + 
!0B@

(1   t) pft
 1

Tt +

(1   t) pft
 1

1CA
1 
+ 1   (37)
The following proposition presents the properties of the optimal tax, t :
Proposition 4 t is interior, monotonically decreasing with the stock of land, Tt; and monotoni-
cally increasing with pft .
33We only analyse the case of the small open economy for simplicity. When we consider the more general case we
need to look at the strategic interaction between di¤erent governments expropriating their own producers (since all
of them a¤ect the general equilibrium price). This complicates substantially the analysis.
34Trade Openness will a¤ect directly K: What I mean with this assumption is that no matter what the change
in K is, the constraint will never be binding for the generation that opens to trade. This is consistent with the
empirical evidence discussed below. The case where trade makes this constraint binding is discussed in the appendix.
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Proof. See Appendix.
It should be noted that when the price of the manufactured goods increases, LMt and the value
of scal income increases. This e¤ect creates incentives to impose a higher tax and is caused by
the fact that as the value of output in the manufacturing sector increases, the production becomes
less sensitive to changes in expropriation.
5.1 Numerical Results
I can express the world price, as a function of the the initial autarky price, pft =  pt,
35 where pt
is the autarkic price at the time of openness t. For expositional purposes, using (24), I can rewrite
pt =  (Tt)
 ; where  =

1 

 
(1+)
(1+(1 (1 t ))
 
1
1 t
1 
; and t is the value of the optimal
tax in the autarkic case. Substituting the latter in (34) I obtain the intersectoral labour allocation,
which is given by:
LAt
LMt
=

1
(1   t) 
 1

(38)
and is constant over time. The intersectoral labour allocation depends now on  : When  = 1;
the autarkic price coincides with the international price and the intersectoral labour allocation is
the same as in autarky if  t = t : When the economy opens to trade, if  is larger than one (i.e.
trade has increased pft ), then labour shifts from the agricultural sector to the manufacturing one,
and the economy produces less food and more manufactured goods. The opposite case occurs if  
is less than one. Substituting the new expression for pft in (36) and (37) I obtain:
[(1 + (1  )) t +  (  2)] = (1   t)
1+
 ( )
1
 (39)
Kt+1
Kt
=
 
(1   t) 1
1 + 
! 
1
1 + ((1   t) )
1

!1 
+ 1   (40)
This new system of equations characterizes the optimal expropriation rate and the growth rate
of capital. Since the solution to this system of equations is not closed-form I turn to the numerical
simulations.
The results are shown in Figures 3 and 4. Figure 3 displays the optimal expropriation rate
while Figure 4 shows the growth rate of the economy as a function of  . In both cases, the dotted
line indicates the values in autarky while the continuous line indicates the corresponding value in
free trade.
Depending on an economys specialisation pattern, trade has di¤erent e¤ects on its growth rate.
First, it should be mentioned that as a consequence of trade openness landowners in general, turn
to expropriate a smaller proportion of the manufacturing output. I see clearly this e¤ect when
 = 1; the relative price pt is the same as in autarky but the landowners set the expropriation
rate 7.5 percentage points lower as Figure 3 shows. As discussed above, this e¤ect occurs because
landowners consider that they cannot a¤ect the relative price pft . In autarky, landowners take into
account the positive e¤ect that a rise in expropriation produces in the value of the manufactured
goods, with the latter inducing them to set a larger expropriation rate. This mechanism is absent
now, so this leads the landowners to reduce the expropriation rate.
35This assumption is made for illustrative purposes since this allows me to simply compare the results with the
autarkic situation. The results are not altered if instead of this we introduce a random vector of world prices.
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Figure 3: Level of Expropriation
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Figure 4: Output Growth Rate.
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However, when the price in free trade is not equal to the autarkic price, there are important
reallocation e¤ects in the labour market that have signicant e¤ects on growth and the landowners
incentives to expropriate. As shown in the previous section, whenever the price pft increases (i.e. the
economy specialises in manufactured goods), labour ows from agriculture into the manufacturing
sector. The rise in the value of manufacturing production, raises the marginal income of taxation
which creates an incentive to raise expropriation. Interestingly, as long as the relative price does
not move very far away from the autarkic price ( < 2), expropriation does not rise as much as to
overcome the price e¤ect, and thus there is a positive e¤ect on growth.
This e¤ect, however only dominates up to a certain point. If there is a large increase in the
relative price of the manufacturing good, the rise in expropriation becomes the dominant e¤ect and
further specialisation decreases the growth rate of output, although for the vast majority of cases,
the growth rate is above the corresponding one in autarky.36
When an economy specialises in agriculture, the reverse occurs. The decrease in the relative
price pft ; increases the marginal productivity of labour in the agricultural sector. This e¤ect reduces
the marginal income of taxation, and thus reduces expropriation, as gure 3 shows (0 <  < 1).
However, the reduction in expropriation is not enough to compensate for the drop in the value
of manufactured production leading to a fall in capital accumulation and the growth rate of the
economy. The more the economy specialises in agricultural goods, the more its growth rate declines
but over a large range of prices, the growth rate exceeds the one in autarky.37
Unlike previous models of trade and dynamic comparative advantage, as long as trade does
not lead economies to strong specialisation trade generates a positive e¤ect on economic growth
through the joint e¤ect of a reduction in expropriation and an increase in specialisation even if the
economies specialise in a technology stagnant sector (i.e. agricultural sector in my model). In the
next section I discuss the implications for the institutional change process.
5.2 The e¤ects on institutional change.
As discussed above, opening up to international markets accelerates institutional change through
two mechanisms: the growth mechanism and the incentive mechanism. The rst one is related to how
trade alters the speed capital accumulates. As international trade generally reduces expropriation,
this raises the returns on capital and promotes capital accumulation.
The second one refers to how trade alters the incentives capitalists have to take the political
power. Trade a¤ects ambiguously the incentives to enter into conict. On the one hand, interna-
tional trade through the reduction in expropriation generally increases the returns on capital. This
could act as a disincentive mechanism: Because the returns on capital are higher under free trade,
capitalists may nd entering into conict less protable.38 However, international trade also a¤ects
36For this exercise trade has always a positive e¤ect on the growth rate of output as long as  < 11:5 (i.e. the
price in the open economy is smaller than 11.5 times the autarkic price). When this does not hold, the expropriation
rate is very high and the economy is dedicating more than 90% of the labour force to produce manufacturing goods.
This result is interesting from a theoretical point of view but very unlikely in reality.
37This will be generally the case provided that   0:25 (i.e. the price in the open economy scenario is one fourth
the autarkic price). This corresponds with a case in which more than 90% of the labour force is dedicated to the
production of agricultural goods. This result is interesting from a theoretical point of view but it is unlikely in reality.
38This is easy to see considering the case of  = 1: In this case the price does not change after trade openness and
the returns on capital after the revolt are the same when the economy is open to trade than when the economy is
closed to trade. In free trade, the returns on capital before the institutional change process starts are higher so the
gains from acquiring the political power are reduced.
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Figure 5: The incentive Mechanism
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ln(')
1 "
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this mechanism through the relationship between prices and expropriation. The way in which this
relationship is altered under free trade generates complex e¤ects: In autarky, the elimination of
expropriation has a cost since lower expropriation implies a lower pt and therefore a lower value for
the returns on capital but it has also a benet since a lower pt implies a higher level of utility. All
of these e¤ects disappear under free trade, since the world price is not a¤ected by expropriation.
Figure 5 shows how the incentive mechanism evolves under free trade (continuous line) and
under autarky (dotted line). What can be observed is that the incentive mechanism is larger in free
trade when the price is below a certain level. When the economy specialises in agricultural goods
or moderately specialises in manufactured goods, trade openness discourages conict. However as
the economy specialises more in manufactured goods, landowners increase the expropriation rate,
which increases the incentives to undertake military action. This implies that, if specialisation
in manufactured goods is strong enough, trade openness will encourage rather than discourage
institutional change. 39
On the other hand, trade openness promotes capital accumulation due to a combination of a
reduction of expropriation and for some cases further specialisation in manufactures. Since capital
accumulates faster, this implies that the capital threshold will be reached earlier. This is what I
call the growth mechanism. Figure 6 illustrates this e¤ect.
The dotted line represents the growth mechanism in autarky. This mechanism is above the
corresponding one in free trade, as long as the growth rate of output is larger in free trade, which
corresponds to most of the cases.
The e¤ects of trade openness on the timing of institutional change are initially ambiguous due
to the presence of these two e¤ects: the incentive mechanism and the growth mechanism. The
39The parameter ' is a constant and we have considered ln' = 0:5 for simplicity. Allowing ' to take di¤erent
values will not alter the qualitative conclusions of the model. Robustness checks allowing for di¤erent values of ' are
provided on request.
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Figure 6: The Growth Mechanism
numerical results, however show, that the former e¤ect is of second order, and that the growth
e¤ect is the dominant one. This nding is conrmed by Figure (7), which shows the combination
of both.
As noted above, the dotted line indicates the autarkic values. Faster growth as a consequence
of free trade promotes earlier institutional change, as long as it raises the growth rate of output,
which is the case for moderate specialisation patterns (changes in the relative price).
Since the e¤ect on the growth rate is the dominant one, my conclusions on an economys spe-
cialisation pattern discussed above, apply to the institutional change argument. In other words,
economies specialising in manufactured goods generally experience larger growth and earlier insti-
tutional change than economies specialising in agriculture. This theory outlines the importance of
trade patterns and specialisation for the creation of a good system of property rights. In the stud-
ied economies, di¤erences in trade patterns create divergent growth and institutional experiences
across countries.40
6 Anecdotal evidence
In the previous sections I have described the main results of the theoretical model. In this section
I discuss the main predictions of the model and how these predictions nd support in the data.
Figure 8 summarizes the main results of the paper. The black line illustrates the economy in
autarky. The green and the blue line describe how the economy in autarky would be if at time
40These qualitative results are robust to changes in parameter values. To verify this robustness, I have carried
out the same exercise for reasonable values of the parameters ,  and . For example for the parameter  we have
allowed values between 0.5 and 0.7 as suggested by Ho¤man (2002). The results are qualitatively unaltered. The
results do not vary signicantly in quantitative terms too. (Available on request).
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Figure 7: Time to institutional change.
Figure 8: The open economy scenario
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t0 the economy opens to trade. The di¤erence between both economies is the result of di¤erent
specialisation patterns. The green line represents an economy specialised in manufactured goods
and the blue line represents an economy specialised in manufactured goods. When the economy
opens to trade the growth rate of output increases due to the positive e¤ect that a general reduction
in expropriation and in some cases further specialisation has on capital accumulation. However,
for a similar change in the relative price with respect to the autarkic one (assumed in the gure),
the economy specialising in manufactured goods grows more so after trade openness the income
green line becomes steeper than the blue line. The fact that both economies grow at a higher rate
implies that the capitaliststhreat of political change becomes binding earlier in both economies. I
denote with t the period in which the capitalistsconstraint becomes binding in the open economy
scenario. Notice that this date varies across both countries, being earlier in the economy specialising
in manufactured goods. Once the constraint becomes binding, as in autarky, the landowners start
a gradual reduction in expropriation to discourage conict, what I have called institutional change.
Acemoglu (2005b) provides extensive evidence on the fact that the Netherlands and England
were undertaking political changes during the 17th and the 18th century that would lead to a more
secure system of property rights, while it was not the case of Spain and Portugal. In this paper I
will focus more on specic evidence related to the predictions regarding the specic role of trade
which is the focus of this paper.
Historical time series for the GDP and its components for Western Europe have been relatively
scarce until recent times. The following evidence is, as most of the historical evidence at this time,
indirect and it should be taken carefully. Maddison (2005)s estimates for the growth rates of
Western European economies (1500-1820) turn out to be 0.80 and 0.56 for the United Kingdom
and the Netherlands, respectively, and 0.51, 0.31 for the case of Portugal and Spain respectively. A
similar pattern has been established for the urbanisation rates.41 While these numbers have been
recently challenged by other economic historians (Alvarez Nogal and Prados de La Escosura (2013),
Broadberry et al. (2010), Malanima (2009)), there is a general consensus on the fact that England
and the Netherlands were experiencing higher GDP growth rates than Spain and Portugal for the
period 1500-1820 and that the latter economies were experiencing an increase in their GDP growth
rates in the 16th century. This is consistent with my rst prediction: The growth rate of output is
larger as a consequence of trade openness. This is also consistent with my second prediction the
growth rate of output should be larger in England and The Netherlands.
For the case of Spain, Alvarez Nogal and Prados de La Escosura (2013)), provide, to the best of
my knowledge, the most complete updated database. Their work reveals that the relative price of
manufactured goods was declining in Spain in the second half of the 16thcentury (1530-1620). The
latter came together with an increase in the share of agriculture in the GDP. The urbanization rate
increased from 1530 until 1591 (an early increase as a consequence of a rise in trade opportunities),
but it declined from 1591-1611. This is consistent with the Spanish economy moving resources
from industry to agriculture as a consequence of a change in the relative price of manufactured
goods probably due to trade openness. This change was stronger when the role of Spanish trade
in manufactured products was falling (the end of the 16th century) (Marquez (2006)).42 This is
41As discussed above, Urbanisation rates for this period are provided in the Appendix.
42During the rst years of trade with the Americas, Spain was able to keep the market in a monopoly and conse-
quently some manufacturing products from spanish origins were shipped to the Americas. This trend changed from
1580 onwards as documented by Marquez (2006).
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consistent with the third prediction of the model: As a consequence of the Spanishs specialisation
in agricultural products in international markets, the increase in the GDPs growth rate was smaller
for Spain.
Englands trade with the Americas started to play a notable role in the second half of the 16th
century. However, the golden period of english trade with America came during the next century
(Kamen (1984)).43 The recent article by Broadberry et al. (2010) reveals that, during the 17th
century, the english share of the GDP in agricultural goods declined in favor of manufacturing and
services. The latter is also consistent with the increase in the urbanization rates this economy
experienced in the 17th century. English real GDP growth started to take-o¤ in the second half
of the 16th century but it is in the second half of the 17th century when the change in GDP p.c.
growth was the strongest one. This is consistent with the third prediction of the model: As a
consequence of the Englands specialisation in manufactured goods , the increase in the GDPs
growth rate was larger.
7 Conclusions
I have developed a model to understand the role that international trade plays in economic growth
through the evolution of institutions. When a social group, whose interests are in conict with
economic growth holds the political power (e.g. the aristocracy in Europe in the Modern Age),
this group establishes an institutional environment that reduces growth. This group, however,
creates institutions that do not lead to full expropriation, because such institutions would wipe out
production and scal rents. The process of capital accumulation over time allows the rival group
to pose a credible threat of acquiring the political power. Given that, the group in power starts
to improve property rights as a concession to discourage the rival group from conict. The latter
process leads to a gradual improvement in property rights until expropriation is no longer in place.
In this context I examine the role played by international trade. I consider the case of a small
open economy where the equilibrium price is given and not a¤ected by individual decisions. I nd
that international trade plays a role in the evolution of the institutional environment by changing
the relative price of the nal goods (and consequently the returns to production factors) and having
general equilibrium price e¤ects. The rst mechanism promotes capital accumulation as long as
the economy specialises in manufactured goods. This acceleration also speeds up the process of
institutional change. The second channel could also generate a positive e¤ect on economic growth
through a reduction of expropriation. This improvement in economic institutions allows the country
to increase the growth rate as a consequence of trade openness, even if it specialises in agricultural
goods for a large range of prices. This result is not found in earlier two sector endogenous growth
models with dynamic comparative advantage.
Although the model predicts positive e¤ects of trade openness on growth for a broad range of
cases, it also predicts divergence across countries based on specialisation patterns. In general, those
countries which specialise in manufactured goods, tend to grow faster, accelerating the process of
institutional change.
I suggested that a similar story might explain the divergent experience of Spain and Portugal on
the one hand, and England and the Netherlands on the other hand in the rst era of globalization.
43Data on british shipments to America before the 16th century are not available due to the fact that these were
done through Spanish (above all) and Portughese intermediaries.
26
While Spain and Portugal specialised in trading agricultural products in the global world, English
and Dutch manufacturers and merchants were improving their economic position by exporting
manufactured goods. My model suggests that world trade enhanced institutional change in the
four countries provided that no strong specialisation occurs. However, countries specialising in
manufactured goods (i.e. England and the Netherlands), should have experienced higher growth
and earlier institutional change. These predictions are consistent with historical evidence.
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8 Appendix A : Autarky
8.1 Urbanization Rates
Figure 9: Urbanization rates (percentage of the population living in cities with more than 10,000
inhabitants) for di¤erent European Countries (1300-1900). Revised estimates from the original
works of Bairoch, Batou and Chevre (1988) and De Vries (1984). Source: Malanima (2007)
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8.2 Proof of Proposition 1
Taking logs and derivatives in 24 I have:
dpt
d t
=
(1  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(1   t)  
2
(1 + (1  (1   t))
Rearranging terms I nd that:
dpt
d t
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2(1   t) < 0
Rearranging terms I have:
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8.3 Indirect utility functions
The utility function of the landowners is given by :
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Using (8), (9) and rearranging terms, I have:
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The utility function of the capitalists is given by: UK(cAKt; c
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Remember that RKt = rtKt: Substituting (11) in (8) and (9) I get: cAKt =
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: Substituting the latter ones in the utility function I have:
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8.4 Capitalists reaction function (Proof of Proposition 2)
In this case I can distinguish two main cases: 0 < " < 1 and the special case in which " = 1: I
proceed rst to discuss the rst case.
In order for (30) to be satised, I need that:
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Substituting equation (27) and rearranging terms I obtain:
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Substituting equation (16) in the previous condition I get:
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Rearranging terms I obtain:
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where:
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Consequently, he reaction function is given by the following expression:
 If Kt  K then undertake military action.
 If Kt < K then do not undertake military action.
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8.4.1 The special case " = 1:
In this case the costs and the benets of the military action increase at the same rate. Considering
this special case,.the necessary condition for having a revolt is given by:
(Kt )
1 " > (( t)')
and substituting the value of " in the previous expression, I have:
1  ( t)'
and after rearranging terms, for a given level of expropriation for the landowners,  t;I can have two
possibilities:
 ()  (') 1 : In this case, the military action is protable independently of the current
capital stock (the constraint is binding at time t = t0): Consequently the reaction of the
capitalists is to undertake the military action in t = 0:
 () > (') 1. In this case the military action is not protable independently of the current
capital stock. Consequently the reation of the capitalists is not to undertake military action
provided that the condition holds.
8.5 Monotonicity of the CapitalistsReaction Function in Autarky (Proof of
proposition 3)
The threshold level of capital necessary to undertake a revolt is given by (28) and takes the following
form:
Kt  K = (( t)')
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1 " :
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In autarky I have an extra e¤ect given by the term ; which measures the ratio between the
relative price of the manufacturing good when landowners are in power and when the capitalists
are in power. The parameter  is increasing with  t.I know that LMt depends on the expropriation
rate so for this proof I use the notation LMt = LMt ( t):
Let us denote with 
( t) =

(1   t)

LMt ( t)
LMt
1 


: Since LMt does not depend on  t;
showing 0 ( t) < 0 is equivalent to show that 
0( t) < 0:
Substituting the value of  in the previous expression I obtain:

( t) =
 
(1   t)

LMt ( t)
LMt
1 
pt
pt
 
1+
!
Notice that LMt ; pt are not dependent on  t: Consequently

0( t) < 0$ dh
d t
< 0whereh = (1   t)
 
LMt ( t)
1 
p
 
1+
t :
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Using (1), (2) and (24) and rearranging terms I get:
h = (1   t)
 
LMt ( t)
1  1  


1 + 
1 + (1  (1   t))

LAt ( t)
LMt ( t)
1 
T
! 
1+
:
Substituting (23) in the latter I have that:
h = (1   t)
1+ 
1+
 
LMt ( t)
1 LMt ( t)
LAt ( t)
 1+
T

1+ :
Notice that the rst term is decreasing in  t and the second term is decreasing in  t: Taking logs
and partial derivative with respect to  t in (23), I have that:
d

LMt ( t)
LAt ( t)

d t
=   1
1   t +

1 + (1  (1   t)) < 0:
Consequently dhd t < 0 and I have shown the property.
8.6 Expropriation in autarky when the constraint is not binding (K < K)
Proposition 5 Let VKt be the indirect utility function of the capitalists:Then:
dVKt
d t
< 0
Proof. Developing the expression of the indirect utility function I have:
VKt = ln
 
(rtKt)
(pt)
1  
1+
!1+
where I have ignored the constant term k: Substituting (2), (23) and (16) in the latter and
rearranging terms I get:
VKt = (1   t)

1 +
1+
  
LMt
 (1 )(1+)+
(1+)
 
LAt
  
1+
Then it is straightforward to see that the derivative of the indirect utility function with respect
to taxes is equal to zero, since dL
M
t
d t
< 0;
dLAt
d t
> 0:
Proposition 6 t = maxVTt( t) 6= 0; 1 , and it is independent of Kt; T: and unique for the
parameter case studied.
Proof. The landownersutility function is given by:
VTt = ln
 
Y At +  tptY
M
t

+ lnY At   (1  ) ln pt
I can express the previous equation as:
VTt = ln



Y At
ptYMt

+  t

+ ln ptY
M
t   (1  ) ln pt
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Rearranging I have that:
VTt = ln



Y At
ptYMt

+  t

+ lnYMt +  ln pt
Using (22) I have:
VTt = ln




1  

(1 + (1  (1   t))
1 + 

+  t

+ lnYMt +  ln pt
Substituting the functional forms for YMt and pt I obtain:
VTt = ln




1 

(1+(1 (1  t))
1+

+  t

+ lnKt + ln(L
M
t )
1 +
 ln

1 


1+
1+(1 (1  t))

LAt
LMt
1 
(Tt)


and rearranging I have:
VTt =Ln
 



1  

1 + (1  (1   t))
1 + 
1 
+  t

1 + 
1 + (1  (1   t))
!
+
Ln
 
LMt
(1 )(1 )  
LAt
(1 )
+ lnKt    ln

1  


(Tt)


| {z }
ln 
It is important to realize that d ln d t = 0, since Kt it is a predetermined variable. Due to the
assumption of Warm-glow preferences, landowners cannot a¤ect Kt by choosing the expropriation
level today and they do not care about the future of their descendants. Substracting the constant
terms and rearranging terms, the expression is as follows:
VTt = Ln
  
(1   t)(1 )(1 )
(1 + (1  (1   t)))
!
(1 + (1  (1   t))) +  t(1 + )(1  )
( (1 + (1  (1   t)) + (1  )(1 + )(1   t))1 
!
+l
(43)
where l is constant from the point of view of expropriation. Taking derivatives and rearranging
terms I arrive at the rst order condition (f.o.c.).:
f = (1  )

(1 )(1+) 
(1+(1 (1  t))+(1 )(1+)(1  t)  
1 
(1  t)

  2(1+(1 (1  t))+
+ 
2+(1+)(1 )
(1+(1 (1  t))+(1 )(1+) t = 0
The latter condition goes to  1 when  t = 1; and it is positive when  t = 0:Moreover this
function is continuous in  t  (0; 1):The intermediate value theorem therefore says that there is an
interior  t; such that: f = 0:
Fig 10 represents the previous condition for the calibrated parameters discussed in the paper.
As I can see the monotonicity and continuity of the function guarantees the existence of a unique
interior solution for the value of  t:
When I have the special case " = 1; the constraint is binding from time t = 0: The landowners
choose the highest expropriation rate such that () > (') 1 holds to avoid conict. As long as
() > (') 1 no change in the expropriation rate and no conict will be observed in the economy.
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Figure 10: First order condition (endogenous prices)
8.7 Existence of the BGP when the capitalistsconstraint is not binding
Proposition 7 A BGP for this economy exists and it is unique.
Proof. From equation (43) see that  t is constant, since the value function only depends on
parameters.
Looking at (23); it is easy to see that the allocation of workers across sectors is also constant
because only depends on  t; :
Then looking at (25), Kt+1Kt is constant. Let denote
Kt+1
Kt
= 1 + g:
Substituting (22) in (26) and rearranging terms:
Y =

(1 + (1  (1   t)) + (1 + )(1  )
(1 + (1  (1   t))

pt
 
LMt
1 
Kt = DKt
which as it is standard in AK models, is linear in the capital stock. Then, Yt+1Yt =
Kt+1
Kt
; since
pt is constant (Equation (24)).
Looking at (19) it can be noticed that
CAt+1
CAt
=
Y At+1
Y At
: Using (1) I have that:
Y At+1
Y At
=

Kt+1
Kt

=
(1 + g) is also constant.
Notice that dt =
Y At
Tt
and wt =
(1 )Y At
Tt
are both linear functions of Y At and other constant
variables. Consequently, both of them are also growing at the constant rate (1 + g):
Finally, the returns on capital rt =  (1   t)
 
LMt
1 
are also constant since  t; LMt are
constant.
When the constraint Kt  K holds, the growth rate of the economy is given by (1 + g1) =
(1 t )(LMt )
1 
(1+) + (1  ): Because K; does not depend on capital, and Kt grows constantly and
positive, then K will be reached at a nite time.
To guarantee that the growth rate of the capital stock is positive, I must assume that
(1 t )(LMt )
1 
(1+)  
 > 0: This condition will be satised as long as the economy starts with a su¢ cient high level
of technology 

 > 
(1 )(LMt )1 
1+


: This condition is similar to the condition r >  in AK
models.
When K > K;  t = 0; in steady state and the growth rate of the economy is given by
1 + g2 = 

(1+)(1 )
(1+(1 ))+(1+)(1 )
1 
+ (1  ): I assume that the condition ;


(1+)(1 )
(1+(1 ))+(1+)(1 )
1     > 0 as well, to have a positive growth rate.
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The preference assumption implies that capitalists will spend a xed proportion of their income
in nal goods and a xed proportion of their income in savings (investment) independently of the
returns to capital. The dynamics of the model are given by the di¤erential equation (25) in autarky
and (40) in free trade. Notice that Kt+1Kt = (1 + g) independently of Ko: I can then conclude that
there are not transitional dynamics in this model.
Corollary 8 The number of years necessary to start the process of institutional change is given
by:
n =
2664 1ln(1 + g)| {z }
Growth
0BB@ ln(')1  "| {z }
Incentives
  lnKt
1CCA
3775
Proof. Since the economy is in a BGP with no transitional dynamics the following expression can
apply:
K = (1 + g)nKt
Taking logs on both sides of the previous equation and rearranging terms yields:
n =

1
ln (1 + g)

(lnK   lnKt)
Substituting the value for K and rearranging terms I have:
n =
2664 1ln(1 + g)| {z }
Growth
0BB@ ln(')1  "| {z }
Incentives
  lnKt
1CCA
3775
9 Appendix B Free Trade
9.1 Expropriation in free trade when the constraint is not binding (Proof of
proposition 4)
Proof. Substituting (34) in (35) and rearranging terms I have:
VTt = ln
0BBB@ Tt +  t

pft
 1

(1   t) 1 
Tt +

pft
 1

(1   t) 1
1 
1CCCA
To solve for the maximization problem when the constraint is not binding, I take the rst order
condition and I rearrange terms. That yields:
f(t ) = (1   t)
1 


pft
 1

0@ 1 ( 1  ) t1 t 
Tt+ t(1  t)
1 


pft
 1

1A+
+
1 

(1  t)
1 


pft
 1

T+(1  t) 1

pft
 1

= 0
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Notice that VTt is continuous on the interval  t 2 [0; 1]; and the rst order condition is positive
when  t = 0; and lim t!1  f( t) < 0; implying that  t must be interior.
Working on f( t) I arrive at the following expression:
Tt [(1 + (1  )) t + (  2)] =  (1   t)
1+


pft
 1

(44)
Notice that the left hand side of condition (44) is monotonically increasing in  t where the right
hand side is monotonically decreasing in  t:Uniqueness is therefore obtained directly applying the
intermediate value theorem.
Totally di¤erentiating equation (44) and rearranging terms yields:
d t
dTt
=
  [(1 + (1  )) t + (  2)]
(1 + ) (1   t)
1


pft
 1

+ (1 + (1  ))Tt
 < 0:
where I have applied the fact that dp
f
t
dTt
= 0:
Totally di¤erentiating (44) and rearranging terms (using the fact that dTt
dpft
= 0) :
d t
dpft
=
(1   t)
1+


pft
 1 

(1 + ) (1   t)
1


pft
 1

+ (1 + (1  ))Tt
 > 0:
Q.E.D.
9.2 Monotonicity of the capitalistsreaction function in free trade and the case
in which the constraint is binding.
The proof of the monotonicity in free trade is rather trivial. The capitalistsreaction function in
free trade is the same as condition (42) except for the fact that  = 1 because prices are determined
in the world market. An increase in expropriation decreases the current returns on capital and that
reduces (1   t)LMt ( t); increasing the net returns of conict.
Figure (11) represents the reaction function as a function of expropriation in both regimes,
autarky and free trade for the current simulation (in this case I take " = 0:5; ln' = 2 for expositional
reasons and without loss of generalisation). Notice that the reaction function in free trade is not
always below the one in autarky.
In the paper I have discussed the simplest case when the constraint is not binding at the moment
of openness. Figure (12) shows the threshold level of capital for each case in trade openness,
provided that the constraint is not binding in autarky.44
What I can observe in gure (12) is that when p < 2; the threshold level of capital in free trade
is larger than in autarky. Consequently the constraint is not binding and the optimal expropriation
rate at the moment of openness is the same as in the benchmark model. However, when p > 2; I
could have two cases: The rst case is the trivial one in which, despite the decrease in the threshold
level of capital, the constraint is still not binding. The second case is the one in which, the constraint
is binding in free trade but not in autarky. In this case trade openness will inmediately start the
process of institutional change. The landowners choose an expropriation rate below the optimal one
44That is, the threshold level of capital for each price in autarky provided that in autarky the optimal level of
expropriation is 0.8096.
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Figure 11: Capitalists Reaction Function
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Figure 12: The threshold level of capital
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to discourage the revolt and this process is repeated through generations until the expropriation is
eliminated.
While the results mostly hold in qualitative terms when the constraint is binding in the genera-
tion in which the economy opens to trade, there is an important di¤erence between both cases that
I need to understand. When the economy becomes more specialised in manufacturing products,
the capitalists are more willing to undertake military action (the capital threshold goes down as
there is more specialisation in manufacturing). The latter implies that the reduction in expropri-
ation becomes larger the more the economy specialises in manufactured goods. This is di¤erent
to the benchmark case in which once you surpass the threshold that I called moderate specialisa-
tion, further specialisation in manufactured goods was in some cases reducing growth and delaying
institutional change.
In the paper I have focused on cases in which the constraint is not binding at the dawn of the
Modern Era because the empirical evidence suggests that this was the case, as in the evidence I
do not observe any structural break inmediately after trade openness. Yet, my conclusions on the
e¤ect of trade openness on institutions are relatively kept even if the constraint is binding at that
period.
9.3 The Special case " = 1 Under Free Trade.
For the special case of " = 1; it is useful to look at gure 5. The growth mechanism is no longer in
place since institutional change does not depend on the capital stock so all the e¤ects of trade on
institutions will come through the incentive mechanism. If the economy specializes in agricultural
products or moderately specializes in manufactured goods, the incentive mechanism discourages
the institutional change ( increases). Consequently, the landowners incentives to expropriate
capitalists are the same as in the benchmark case because the constraint is not binding. I will see a
change in expropriation depending on trade patterns, but no institutional change will be observed
since the benets of the conict do not compensate the costs of entering into it.
When the economy strongly specializes in manufactured goods,  decreases. This implies that
the constraint could be binding in some cases when it was not binding in autarky. Landowners
will respond to that by reducing expropriation up to the point at which the conict is discouraged
again.
To sum up, in the extreme case of " = 1, the main message of the impact of trade on the current
set of institutions remains unaltered. However with " = 1 trade can not implement institutional
change.
10 Appendix C: Robustness
In this section I focus on robustness checks for the institutional parameter ": In the text I have
considered the case where " = 0:5: The results are qualitatively robust to change in ": For the
quantitative implications I consider two di¤erent extreme cases " = 0:1 (in this case the revolt cost
is not very sensitive to changes in the current capital stock) or " = 0:9 (in this case the revolt cost
is very sensitive to changes in the current capital stock). The results are shown below:
40
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5 5.5 6 6.5 7 7.5 8 8.5 9 9.5 10 10.5 11 11.5 12
0
500
1000
1500
ce
relative price
ce
" = 0:1
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5 5.5 6 6.5 7 7.5 8 8.5 9 9.5 10 10.5 11 11.5 12
0
2000
4000
6000
8000
10000
12000
14000
ce
relative price
ce
" = 0:9
The previous gures show the time to undertake the revolt for di¤erent levels of ": An interesting
observation is the fact that as " increases, the number of years necessary to undertake the revolt
increases considerably. In relative terms, the necessary years to undertake the revolt do not change
with this parameter. If the economy does not change the price level between autarky and free trade
(relative price=1), the economy in free trade needs approximately 16% of the number of years
necessary to undertake military action in autarky. Therefore, changes in the parameter " a¤ect
only the number of years the economy will need to undertake the revolt in both scenarios but it
does not a¤ect the relative number of years.
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